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Preface 
Spoofing is one of the newest forms of cyber-attack, a technological methodology 
adapted to mask the identity of spammers who have faced hostile reaction in response to 
bulk, unsolicited, electronic mail messages.[1] Sending Spam, however, is no longer the 
only reason for deception, as crackers have taken pleasure in the challenge of 
manipulating computer systems and, additionally, find recreational enjoyment in doing 
so. In this legal Note, the author’s intent is to show that criminal, rather than civil liability 
is the best way to effectively deter and punish the spoofer. The injury that results when a 
computer system’s technological safety measures fail to adequately safeguard the system 
affects not only the owner of the hijacked e-mail address, but also the Internet Service 
Provider, and the Network as a whole. Current Anti-Spam Legislation is arguably 
ineffective at targeting these particular types of malicious attacks, and a different legal 
approach is suggested. 
 
This Note will examine Source Address Spoofing, the newest cyber crime, and 
provide a technological explanation as to how the act of spoofing is perpetrated, as a 
means of demonstrating criminal intent. As such, civil penalties are not enough. The 
practice has been referred to as “aggravated spam,” spam being an area of great concern 
in Internet regulation already. It is argued, however, that the focus of legislation should 
not be on spoofing as an aggravated form of spam, where spam, in fact, embodies first 
amendment protection as a form of free speech. To so reason supports the imposition of 
monetary fines as adequate. The focus, rather, should be on the actual e-mail and the 
Internet itself as an extension of writings and telecommunications, whereby forging the 
origin of an e-mail address in “cyberspace” constitutes forgery in the same way as is 
currently prohibited in “real space.” 
 
Current legislation is pending in a majority of States to specifically regulate the 
use of spam. Accordingly, current anti-spam legislation, imposing civil liability, will be 
analyzed to determine whether it is the right approach for targeting this more heinous 
type of cyber attack. A stronger deterrent, with penal repercussions, is critical. Using 
technical explanation, a parallel will be drawn between cyberspace and real space to 
illustrate why current anti-spam legislation will be ineffective as currently proposed. In 
support of the argument for criminal liability, current criminal procedures that have been 
in place for decades, which prohibit misrepresentations by mail in real space, will be 
applied to cyberspace to show that it is applicable in this new domain as well.  
 
Traditionally, technology has been a vehicle for advancing the goals of society 
and for effecting social change.[2] However, technology can also be just as easily used to 
circumvent the law, where the perpetrator effectively has the ability to commit a wrong, 
and then shield him or herself from liability through technological manipulation. As 
digital communicative capabilities are increasing in proportion to technological 
advancement, so too are the abilities to apply that technological knowledge to efforts that 
may ultimately thwart attempts to keep the Internet honest. While discouraging 
technological advancement should not be the ultimate goal of any legislation, prohibiting 
an illegitimate use of technology should be. Legislation generally cannot be responsive to 
rapid technological changes. Laws that address a problem in its earliest stages, for 
example, often become obsolete as technology evolves to circumvent the law, or 
counterproductive as the law discourages the evolution of technological solutions to a 
problem.  
 
I. The Matrix of the Internet 
 
The Internet is not a single network, but rather a worldwide matrix of hundreds of 
thousands of networks.[3] When a user transmits a message, the data within that message 
is divided into “packets”[4] which are routed separately through the networks of the 
Internet. An e-mail message is divided into two parts: The header, which contains 
information regarding the sender and the recipient, and the body, which contains the 
actual text message.[5] Each packet, in fact, is preceded by its own header.[6]  
 
An e-mail address consists of three parts: The User ID, the Domain Name, and the 
Domain Name Suffix.[7] Nameservers translate Domain Names (including the suffix) 
into IP Addresses, which consist of numbers that are readable and understandable by the 
Internet Protocol.[8] The Root Nameservers carry the fundamental part of the 
transmission, which entails locating Nameservers for the Top Level Domain Suffices.[9] 
Hundreds of thousands of Nameservers for the various domains handle the rest.[10] Thus, 
every domain has at least two independent name servers.[11] Massive databases list the 
matches between each Domain Name and its correlating IP Address.[12]  
 
Internet Protocol is the set of technological standards and specifications that 
enable the routing of information across networks, so that e-mail messages can be 
successfully delivered and received.[13] Internet Protocol delineates how the data 
contained within an e-mail message is divided into “packets,” which are each coded with 
the IP Address translation.[14] A particular message is comprised of multiple packets, 
which must be reassembled once they arrive separately at their destination. A second 
protocol handles this reassembly process.[15]  
 
When an e-mail message is transmitted from one e-mail address to another, the 
packets generally pass through at least four computers. From the sender’s computer, the 
packets travel to the mail server computer of the sender’s local Internet Service Provider 
(“ISP”), or intranet if the message originates from within an organization.[16] The “ISP” 
computer may then send the packets through a series of other ISPs, each constituting a 
“node” in the chain of destination, until arriving at the mail server of the recipient’s 
ISP.[17] The disassembled message remains there until the intended recipient retrieves it 
onto his or her own computer.[18] The Internet Protocol handles the routing and ties 
together the whole chain, enabling the data packets to travel through the Internet.[19]  
 
Every computer on the Internet has a unique numerical address, called an Internet 
Protocol or IP address, which is associated with a more readily recognizable domain 
name. As the e-mail message travels from sender to recipient, each computer transmitting 
the message attaches identifying data to the “received field” in the header.[20] The 
information serves as a kind of electronic postmark for the handling of the message. 
Ideally, the computers on the network will only accept the packets that are addressed to 
them,[21] and this is how the e-mail message ultimately “finds” its proper destination. It 
is possible for a sender to alter (or “spoof”) the header information by misidentifying 
either the computer from which the message originated or other computers along the 
transmission path. 
 
Source Address Spoofing Defined[22] 
 
A spoofer, in Internet terms, is defined generally as the “cracker”[23] who alters, 
or “forges,” an e-mail address, pretending to originate a message from a different source 
address than that which he or she truly has. There are many ways a cracker may do this, 
and there are many types of attacks.[24] The attacker may do this to gain access to a 
secured site that would accept the “hijacked” address as one of few permissible 
addresses, or more maliciously, the reason may be to hide the source of any type of 
attack.[25] “Email spoofing is often an attempt to trick the user into making a damaging 
statement or releasing sensitive information (such as passwords).”[26] Furthermore, the 
spoofer is sly. He or she may send an e-mail to the victims’ accounts claiming to be from 
a system administrator, and request users to change their passwords to a specified string, 
threatening to suspend their account if they do not comply. Similarly, they might send an 
e-mail claiming to be from a person in authority, and request users to send them a copy of 
a password file or other sensitive information.[27]  
 
How the cracker is able to commit this act: 
 
Spoof attacks occur at the Protocol layer level.[28] When the spoofer’s goal is to 
either gain access to a secured site[29] or to mask his or her true identity, he or she may 
hijack an unsuspecting victim’s address by falsifying the message’s routing information 
so that it appears to have come from the victim’s account instead of his or her own.[30] 
He or she may do so through the use of “sniffers.” Since information intended for a 
specific computer must pass through any number of other computers while in transit, the 
data essentially becomes fair game, and sniffers may be used to essentially capture the 
information en route to its destination.[31] Sniffer software can be programmed to select 
data intended for any or every computer.[32] Thus, the spoofer can use the recipient’s 
address, which is found in the header, and configure his or her own machine to emulate 
the recipient’s machine.[33] When information comes along the network that is intended 
for the true recipient, the spoofer can receive it instead. In this way, the spoofer is able to 
gain entry into those sites to which the recipient had access, and thus has the ability to 
now steal passwords, credit card information, and other personal information, and use 
that information for any number of illegitimate purposes. Additionally, the spoofer can 
also automatically send a packet back to the sender, which makes the sender believe that 
its message was properly received.[34]  
 
The spoofer may also alter the original e-mail and then relay it on to the intended 
recipient,[35] or he or she can change the message in its entirety, and send it to a different 
recipient or recipients altogether.[36] If and when the recipient responds, that message 
will be routed back to the original sender, not to the spoofer.[37] The spoofer, however, 
will need to sniff the response off the network for the attack to go unnoticed.[38] 
Conversely, when the spoofing involves unsolicited bulk e-mail, the attacker will choose 
not to sniff the responses off the network, thereby remaining unacquainted with the 
effects of his or her attacks. These hostile reactions have been the cause for spammers to 
mask their identities initially.  
 
The victim and the injuries involved  
 
The victim of a spoof attack is often unaware that he or she has been violated. 
Moreover, he or she is likely unaware that his or her address has been hijacked for the 
purpose of being the perceived sender of an e-mail message, or worse yet, bulk mail that 
may involve thousands of unsolicited e-mail messages.[39] Additionally, spoofing 
victims are often then inundated with thousands of “bounced-back” e-mails from bad 
addresses, but even worse, an inevitable multitude of angry recipients send their own 
messages, asking to be removed from the sender’s mailing list.[40] Due to the additional 
effect that this has on the Internet Service Provider’s ability to continue to provide quality 
service to its customers, victims may also lose their account privileges for violating their 
ISP’s anti-spam policy.[41] The Spoofer effectively avoids liability for any of this 
wrongdoing, and his or her goal of sending unsolicited mass-mailings is achieved. This 
practice of cost-shifting - from deceptive spoofers to the Internet’s end user - has been 
likened to sending junk mail with postage due, or to making telemarketing calls to 
someone’s pay-by-the-minute cellular phone.[42] Both of which are concededly morally 
repugnant acts.  
 
Internet Service Providers, who also become a victim to spoofing, assume the true 
costs of the mass distributions (aka “Spam”), as they are then forced to purchase 
additional servers to process the increased flow of e-mail messages. Failure to provide 
these additional resources will result in decreased quality of the service to customers. The 
reality of the situation is that the service could actually slow to a point of virtual 
stoppage.[43] 
 
In addition to the tangible effects that this practice has on its victims, there exists 
the very real danger that the message that is forwarded under its illegitimate veil is 
actually a virus waiting to invade hundreds of thousand of computers.[44] What’s more, 
the unsuspecting recipient may even recognize the address. Thus, he or she will believe 
that the message was truly sent from a friend or family member, and then becomes the 
first victim of the attack. He or she will open the e-mail, trusting its contents, and the 
virus will immediately then spread to each address that is listed within his or her address 
book, and pass on indefinitely. Thus, what is essentially a wasteful activity also poses a 
threat to the security and reliability of Internet communications.  
 
The legal problem with spoofing: 
 
The imposition of civil liability will be ineffective at serving as either a stiff 
deterrent or as adequate justice, notwithstanding its attempt to give back those costs that 
are imposed upon the ISPs, which are effectively evaded by the attackers. Without 
criminal liability, Internet Service Providers have neither the legal latitude nor the 
resources that government agencies have to investigate the frequent occurrences of 
spoofing. Nor would the Internet Service Providers have the authority that a 
governmental police task force or agency would have to invade the privacy of Internet 
users and thereby target the source of the attack. Under a criminal realm, a 
“cyberwarrant” of sorts could issue and provide greater hope for actually getting to the 
root of the problem, i.e. the Internet user who conceals his or her address when 
perpetrating an attack.  
 
Additionally, the costs and the time investments that would have to be imposed 
upon the ISPs would be overly burdensome. The Internet Service Providers could not be 
expected to take on this burden alone. With civil liability, however, the right of action 
remains private. Accordingly, with presumably different levels of involvement and/or 
willingness to get involved among the ISPs altogether, it is possible that the quality of 
enforcement, if left to the ISPs, will not be consistent.  
 
Considering the inability to find, and therefore enjoin spoof attacks, in 
combination with the continued imposition of attack costs onto the Internet Service 
Provider rather than the attacker, spoofing is unlikely to be deterred by mere threat of 
civil penalties alone. This is partly because the benefits to the attacker outweigh the 
nearly nonexistent costs, and in effect, serve as a disincentive for them to stop on their 
own. In its current state, spoofing is easy to do, difficult to trace, and worse yet, 
seemingly impossible to prevent.[45]  
 
Current legislative attempts have their beginnings in 1997, when complaints were 
received from ISPs and their subscribers that an increasing portion of their time and 
resources was being wasted reading, sifting through, and deleting unwanted, unsolicited, 
and misrepresented mail.[46] While it appears as though legitimate[47] spam does have 
first amendment protection[48] as an arguably effective marketing tool, legislation that 
has been introduced or enacted aims at making sure that the mass mailing remains 
legitimate.[49]  
 
Last year alone, thirty states introduced anti-spam legislation.[50] Of these thirty, 
seven states have already enacted their proposals. The twenty remaining states currently 
have anti-spam laws in place.[51] These laws, inter alia, strive to prohibit falsification 
and misrepresentation in the origin of, or the routing information on, the e-mail message. 
It will seek to prohibit these offenses in two ways: by enjoining the behavior and by 
imposing a fine. That is to say, they will impose for the most part, civil liability. This 
civil legislation will most likely be ineffective at preventing spoofing. Without the ability 
to identify the attacker, money damages cannot serve to deter a spoofer from this 
practice, nor can an injunction effectively protect those who fall victim. 
 
Pending Federal Legislation is flawed:  
 
As of current, the act of spoofing is being viewed as a private action, rather than 
one against society. This classification thwarts legislation’s aim of implementing the 
proper balance between punishing social harm and encouraging social good. The primary 
goal of criminal law is deterrence of those behaviors that cause social harm. Civil laws 
rely on the ability of one individual to combat societal offenses, one perpetrator at a time. 
 
Current pending federal anti-spam legislation would seek to prohibit anonymous 
spam and forged headers, require opt-out or filtering procedures for consumers who wish 
to be deleted from spam lists or to not receive spam, and provide for civil liability for 
spamming violations.[52] Although this sounds promising, the inability of this legislation 
to succeed is illustrated by several examples.  
 
Specifically, the “CAN SPAM Act of 2001” would require unsolicited 
commercial e-mail to have a valid return address to facilitate consumers’ removal from 
spam lists, placing enforcement in the hands of the Federal Trade Commission. It would 
also permit Internet Service Providers to enforce violations of up to $10 per illegal spam.  
 
The Coalition Against Unsolicited Commercial E-mail (“CAUCE”) is pessimistic 
that this Act will be effective, being that this proposal is purely “opt-out.” Spammers will 
still be able to send massive amounts of e-mail, shrouded in a veil of legitimacy, and 
recipients will have to be the ones who bear the burden of contacting each and every new 
advertiser.[53] 
 
Some Federal Legislation, although on the right track, is also ultimately flawed.  
 
The “Unsolicited Commercial Electronic Mail Act of 2001” was proposed in 
response to the plethora of new cyberpromoters that collect millions of e-mail addresses 
from service providers without their consent, mail to those who have already expressed 
desire to be kept off bulk e-mail lists, and/or purposefully disguise their identity or return 
address. The continued problem with these practices is in dealing with their refusal to 
yield to public pressure, private suit, or any other citizen action. If not stopped, the major 
concern is that such will overwhelm the Internet, and ultimately paralyze legitimate 
online commerce. The Act amends the Federal Criminal Code to provide criminal 
penalties for intentionally initiating the transmission of any unsolicited commercial 
electronic mail message to a protected computer in the United States, with knowledge 
that any domain name or other identifying information contained in or accompanying 
such message is false or inaccurate. The response to this form of Legislation is generally 
supportive, as it contains several acceptable provisions, i.e. prohibition on forgery 
techniques, enforcement of ISP anti-spam policies, and provision of a private right of 
action for recipients and ISPs.[54]  
 
While the proposal of this Bill seemed promising, the House Energy & 
Commerce committee’s unfortunate decision was to pass a revised version, which 
effectively gutted the ISP policy provisions and replaced them with problematic 
provisions. According to CAUCE, the problem with these revisions is that the Act now 
requires a school, business, or ISP to first receive a flood of spam, before then being able 
to send a complaint. Only if a complaint is ignored would they then be able to sue under 
this law to stop further injury from resulting. Additionally, the Act requires a business or 
ISP to install expensive and complex filtering equipment as a requirement for enforcing 
it.[55]  
 
A second proposal, the “Anti-Spamming Act of 2001” also seeks to amend the 
Federal Criminal Code. It would provide criminal penalties for intentionally initiating the 
transmission of bulk unsolicited electronic e-mail with knowledge that the message 
falsifies any of the following: Internet domain, header information, date or time stamp, 
originating e-mail address, or other identifier. It also makes illegal the sale or distribution 
of software whose purpose is to send messages with any of the above characteristics.[56] 
While this legislation is also on the right track, it is similarly unlikely to pass due to its 
over-inclusiveness. It prohibits technology that can have perfectly legitimate uses. The 
ultimate goal of anti-abuse legislation should, in fact, be to outlaw the acts of fraud, 
abuse, and trespass that are committed by crackers, not the tools they employ.  
 
A final example, the “E-Mail User Protection Act,” if passed, would seek to 
prohibit the sending of unsolicited bulk e-mail containing false sender information, a 
false return address, or other false header information. Spamming would be permitted, 
provided no forgery is involved.[57] Retribution under this Act would constitute a 
combination of civil and criminal liabilities. It would call upon the Federal Trade 
Commission (“FTC”), empowering it to enforce violations as unfair or deceptive trade 
practices.  
 
It is again unlikely, however, that this legislation will be effective. CAUCE 
submits that this type of bill would actually be unacceptable to most service providers. In 
order to benefit from this Act, the inclusion of valid contract information in every UCE 
message would be required. Further, ISPs would be required to maintain and make 
available lists of their users who had requested to continue to receive UCE. Both domain 
owners and ISPs would be required to register their preferences with the Federal Trade 
Commission. While this is a burdensome requirement, it could also be quite confusing to 
match the domain names contained in e-mail addresses to the policies listed on an FTC 
master “opt-out” list. Additionally, CAUCE is adamant to opine that the terms of a 
contract between ISPs and its customers should not be dictated by D.C. legislators.[58]  
 
Two additional Acts, the “Electronic Mailbox Protection Act of 1997” and the 
“Netizens Protection Act of 1997,”[59] also attempt to target distributions by 
unidentifiable senders, specifically to an electronic mail address of an individual with 
whom such person lacks a pre-existing and ongoing business or personal relationship, 
unless said individual provides express invitation or permission. This lack of a pre-
existing relationship is viewed as an increasingly serious threat to online commerce and 
personal privacy rights.[60] Similarly, however, the remedy sought is civil damages, 
which is arguably ineffective at deterring this offense.  
 
Thus, it appears that legislation is taking a step in the right direction. For 
effectiveness and for consistency, however, federal legislation with teeth is crucial. The 
current proposals are not powerful enough. We must pull from our legislative history 
those statutes that have proved successful in traditional settings, and apply them to these 
modern parallels. Considering the inability of legislation to keep up with the speed of 
technological advancements, there is minimal opportunity to make incremental 
improvements. The first round of legislation has to be an immediate success. 
 
Criminal liability is necessary 
 
  For the reasons that follow, the focus on stopping spoofing has shifted to the 
detriment of effective legislation. The focus should not be on spoofing as an aggravated 
form of spam because spam embodies first amendment protections to free speech. Rather, 
the focus should be on e-mailing and the Internet as an extension of writings and 
telecommunications, whereby forging an e-mail address in “cyberspace” constitutes 
forgery in the same way as is currently prohibited in “real space.” 
 
As a foundation for the analysis that follows, it is worth noting that it is not 
uncommon for a court to determine that the assumption of a false name and address 
constitutes a “consciousness of guilt”[61] on behalf of the perpetrator, where he or she 
has attempted to avoid detection for the crime that has been committed. Thus, when such 
an act of deception is carried out, criminal intent is presumed to have been present. The 
groundwork is then laid for imposing criminal liability, alone or in combination with civil 
liability, and the door to governmental investigation could effectively be opened to 
successfully trace the routing back to the perpetrator.  
 
The investigative burden would no longer be on an ISP or end user, but rather on 
a governmental agency, having greater access, resources, and skills to identify 
wrongdoers and prosecute them. A criminal route needs to be taken, not only for 
efficiency and ease of prosecution, but also to better serve justice. Criminal sanctions 
punish social harm and encourage social good. These goals are unattainable through 
continued reliance on civil actions. First, private individuals have limited resources with 
which to identify spoofers. Second, mass e-mailers are not deterred by insubstantial civil 
judgments, as such judgments are often greatly outweighed by the fruits of spoofing 
activities. 
 
It is undisputable that a United States citizen may not have his or her privacy 
invaded without probable cause that there has been some unlawful act committed.[62] 
Only then is the government justified in stepping in to remedy that wrong. Spoofing is a 
cyber wrong, and the perpetrator of the attack must not be allowed to mask his or her 
identity and maintain an undeserved privacy.  
 
It is, on the other hand, arguable that an Internet user does not at all have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy, however it is still very much an open question.[63] 
The U.S. Supreme Court has stated that American citizens have the protection of the 
Fourth Amendment guarantee of freedom from search and seizure absent a warrant, when 
there is a reasonable expectation of privacy.[64] Without a reasonable expectation of 
privacy, however, there is no privacy right to protect. If the Internet user relinquishes his 
or her desire to maintain privacy by communicating through networks over what are 
essentially public lines, be they telephone wires or cables, he or she in essence may waive 
the right to maintain that privacy, and criminal search and seizure principles would not 
even be necessary. 
 
The United States Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Katz[65] sets forth 
the foundation for both federal and state constitutional law analysis with respect to 
constitutionally protected privacy expectations. Thus, any discussion of whether an 
internet user has a justifiable expectation of privacy that is protected from unreasonable 
searches and seizures must necessarily begin with Katz.[66] In his concurring opinion, 
Justice Harlan articulated his view of the appropriate inquiry with respect to determining 
privacy rights under the Fourth Amendment. In determining in which areas a person has a 
constitutionally-protected expectation of privacy, Justice Harlan set forth a two-fold 
requirement that a person: (1) have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of 
privacy; and (2) that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as 
reasonable.[67] 
 
This two-pronged test has been the basis for the finding that a reasonable 
expectation of privacy does not exist.[68] In Rekasie, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
wrote that while the defendant might have possessed an actual or subjective expectation 
of privacy in his telephone conversation, because of the nature of telephonic 
communication, it is not an expectation that society would recognize as objectively 
reasonable. The Court explained, “[a] telephone call received by or placed to another is 
readily subject to numerous means of intrusion at the other end of the call, all without the 
knowledge of the individual on the call.”[69] Thus, following a similar analysis in the 
Internet realm, it is likely that a court may also find that it is not objectively reasonable 
for one to assume an expectation of privacy when mass distributing thousands of e-mails. 
Coupled with a presumption of criminal intent due to the aforementioned consciousness 
of guilt discussion, the argument for the imposition of criminal liability is bolstered.  
 
Assuming arguendo that a reasonable expectation of privacy does exist over the 
lines of Internet communication, the principles of search and seizure would then be 
necessary within the institution of criminal liability. A “cyberwarrant” of sorts would be 
issued based on having the requisite probable cause, and it would enable the proper 
governmental agents to effectively get to the source of the offense, i.e. the initiator of the 
spoofed e-mail. This aspect of righting the wrong would essentially be impossible by 
means of a civil route to justice. The combination of civil penalties with criminal will be 
the most effective strategy, as it would give those costs incurred back to the injured ISPs, 
will effectively punish the wrongdoer, and will deter a large portion of future attacks by 
illustrating that the wrong will be immediately discovered, investigated, and prosecuted. 
 
Progressive state legislative history treats criminal liability as effective: 
 
  In analyzing traditional state legislation, one can see that the offenses sought to be 
prohibited in real space are analogous to those that we now seek to prohibit in 
cyberspace. Two common law offenses that this author proposes to be similar in regards 
to effectively prosecuting spoof attacks are those of forgery and mail fraud, each of 
which are subsequently discussed.  
 
In 1992, New York was one of the first states in the nation to address the problem 
of telecommunications fraud and theft, by enacting legislation that resulted in prosecution 
and conviction of these offenders.[70] Subsequently, other states followed suit. Currently, 
however, the majority of state legislatures that are attempting to target spoofing are 
proposing that the penalties imposed be civil. New York parts from this majority and 
seeks to impose criminal liability for these offenses. New York should again be allowed 
to pave the way for prosecution and conviction of offenders that use the Internet to 
commit forgery and fraud. 
 
NY CLS Penal § 170.00 (2002) defines a forged instrument as a “written 
instrument which has been falsely made . . . or altered.” Further, a “written instrument” 
includes “computer data or a computer program . . . containing written or printed matter 
or the equivalent thereof . . . which is capable of being used to the advantage or 
disadvantage of some person.” Something is “falsely altered” when, “without the 
authority of anyone entitled to grant it, [the forger] changes a written instrument . . . so 
that such instrument in its thus altered form appears or purports to be in all respects an 
authentic creation of or fully authorized by its ostensible maker ….”[71] 
 
Although, traditionally, a “written instrument” has been thought of in the pen and 
paper sense, applying this code to a technological setting would not be such a foreign 
notion. Although few would conceive of technology as constituting a “written 
instrument” for purposes of applying the code, the definitions of “forged instrument” and 
“written instrument” are sufficiently broad to include such technology.[72] In fact, even 
under common law notions, the Supreme Court of the United States was not satisfied that 
forgery was limited to the production of a writing by means of only a pen.[73] The Court 
concluded that the nature of the crime of forgery was not changed whether it was 
committed by “printing, or by stamping, or with an engraved plate, or by writing with a 
pen.”[74]  
 
In State of New York v. Miguel Pena,[75] the court held that the evidence 
sufficiently established that a cellular phone was a “written instrument” and that a 
“cloned telephone” was a forged instrument because it fit the definition of a written 
instrument and had been falsely altered. The court further determined that the evidence 
sufficiently proved that the defendant had possessed, with knowledge of its character, 
equipment specifically designed for use in counterfeiting or otherwise forging numbers 
for the purpose of cloning cellular telephones. Thus, the defendant was convicted on 
criminal possession of a forged instrument in the second degree, criminal possession of 
computer related material, and criminal possession of forgery devices.[76]  
 
Following such a rationale, it can further be determined that the spoofer also 
possesses, with knowledge of its character, equipment that is specifically designed for use 
in alteration. That is, “sniffing software” could be considered to be an illegitimate device 
in the forgery scheme,[77] and possession of that device presents consciousness of the 
perpetrator’s guilt. This is so when no other purpose for having such a device is provided.  
 
The essence of any forgery crime is the intent to defraud or injure.[78] So being, 
this author proposes that an e-mail must also fit into the definition of a written 
instrument, wherein changing the routing information or the content of the message 
would then constitute fraudulent and material alteration thereof.  
 
“To ‘falsely alter’ [computer data] means to change [computer data] without the 
authority of anyone entitled to grant such authority, whether it be in complete or 
incomplete form, by means of erasure, obliteration, deletion, insertion of new [data], 
transposition of [data], or any other means, so that such instrument in its thus altered 
form falsely appears or purports to be in all respects an authentic creation of or fully 
authorized by its ostensible maker.”[79] 
 
II. Fraud 
  
States began enacting legislation in the 1930’s, which sought to deter and to 
punish use of the mails to defraud or misrepresent the public. To succeed on a claim that 
is based on acts of mail and wire fraud, a plaintiff must prove (1) the existence of a 
scheme to defraud, (2) the participation by the defendant in the scheme with the specific 
intent to defraud, (3) and use of the Postal Service or interstate telephone to defraud must 
involve some sort of fraudulent misrepresentations or omissions reasonably calculated to 
deceive persons of ordinary prudence and comprehension.[80] Plaintiffs must prove that 
defendant either devised the fraudulent scheme itself, or willfully participated in it with 
knowledge of its fraudulent nature.[81] This requisite intent to defraud may be proven by 
either direct evidence or demonstrated circumstantially.  
 
It is seemingly clear then, that the use of public phone lines to send electronic 
mail might also constitute mail fraud and fit within the definition thereof.  
 
As previously demonstrated, spoofers generally alter the origin of their spam and 
e-mail messages for the purpose of avoiding the hostile reaction that they intend and 
often do receive from their bulk mailings. This illustrates the existence of a scheme to 
defraud the recipient. Additionally, with involvement of the proper governmental 
agencies, the second prong of the mail fraud requirements may also be met - the 
participation of the defendant in this scheme to defraud. With the mere imposition of civil 
liability, the responsibility would be solely on the individual recipient of the spoof to 
determine the sender’s identity alone - clearly an impossible task.  
 
Current state legislatures have attempted to modernize the prohibition of fraud in 
communications. One of the first judicial tests took place in the state of Washington last 
year. In State of Washington v. Heckel, respondent began sending unsolicited commercial 
e-mail (spam) over the Internet.[82] His intention was to market a book that he had 
written, but his hundreds of thousands of weekly e-mails contained false and misleading 
information in the subject line.[83] The state Supreme Court declared that Washington’s 
commercial electronic mail act was sufficiently limited to reach deceptive e-mails and 
that the local benefits of the Act outweighed any burdens placed on those sending 
commercial e-mail messages.[84] While the Superior Court’s concern when it declared 
the anti-spam law unconstitutional was whether a state should be involved in the 
regulation of the Internet, the Supreme Court’s subsequent reversal and remand for trial 
indicates that when the perpetrator is identifiable, the courts will take an active role in 
stopping this unlawful behavior, provided that the Act enables them to impose adequate 
liability.  
 
Stressing the importance of criminal liability from this angle as well, criminal 
investigation would enable the routing of the spoofed e-mail to be traced back to the 
perpetrator’s account, by tracking the nodes through which it passed en route to its 
destination. The requirement of the ISP then, would be to disclose the name of the user 
who owns the address. The ISP will additionally be benefited as it will presumably then 
be able to prosecute the violation of its anti-spamming policy. Additionally, it may well 
be that this information is public - headers are readily viewable with some of the more 
popular mail clients - assuming this part is not that which has been altered, the attacker is 
readily identifiable.[85]  
 
Where the originator is not readily identifiable, however, an investigation would 
ensue to trace the origin of the e-mail. The investigation could entail, for one, detection of 
whether or not sniffing has occurred to wrongfully pull messages off the network. 
Furthermore, since each packet passes through various nodes in the destination chain, 
there will be an electronic record kept of that path which can be reversed back to the 
point of origination. With the determination that a crime has been committed, Title 18 of 
the U.S. Code could then apply in order to access stored electronic communication and 
records. Under this Title, “a governmental entity may require the disclosure by a provider 
of electronic communication service of the contents of a wire of electronic 
communication, that is in electronic storage in an electronic communications system . . . 
pursuant to a warrant issued using the procedures described in the Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure by a court with jurisdiction over the offense under investigation.”[86] 
 
Current State Legislation 
 
As previously mentioned, thirty states have introduced anti-spam legislation in the 
last year, seven of which have already enacted their proposals. The twenty remaining 
states currently have anti-spam laws in place. A closer look at the twenty-seven enacted 
statutes, however, reveals only two states with impositions of criminal liability, or a mix 
of civil and criminal liabilities.[87] Although this is a small percentage, the fact that these 
states have proposed criminal liability for this cyber wrong at all supports this author’s 
argument. 
 
The best approach would be the federal enactment of a uniform prohibition 
against spoofing altogether, criminally sanctionable in cases of violation. Although state 
legislation is encouraging, federal legislation is preferred, since transmitters of 
unsolicited bulk e-mail can easily move from state to state to carry out their feat.  
 
Judicial intervention can take prohibition of cybercrimes only so far 
 
The courts have generally been successful in stopping aggravated spam, as 
distinguished from spoofing. With aggravated spam, a more moderate form of spoofing, 
an unsolicited commercial e-mailer can be enjoined under such theories of trespass to 
chattel and computer fraud.[88] The main distinction here is that the spammer creates an 
e-mail account and will falsify point-of-origin information, i.e. use a victim’s domain 
name (generally the Internet Service Provider[89]) for the purpose of transmitting mass 
amounts of e-mail. When liability attaches, it is for misappropriation and dilution of 
trademark. In these cases, the ISP has a better chance of identifying the perpetrator. In the 
case of spoofing, however, the origin of the e-mail is completely disguised. This means 
that an e-mail distribution can be delivered appearing to have initiated from the address 
of either you or me. Any investigation by the ISP under this scenario would ultimately 
reach a dead end with the arrival at the complainant or the victim. Moreover, if enjoined 
by the courts, there is nothing to prevent the spoofer from simply creating a new website 
and continuing this operation without pause.  
 
Prevention by criminal deterrence and technology 
 
Legal Approaches: 
 
  In addition to the attempts to provide legislative relief for this growing concern, 
the government has also implemented the “Computer-Telecommunications Coordinator” 
(CTC) program.[90] Under this program, each United States Attorney’s Office, as well as 
a few other Department entities, has designated at least one Assistant U.S. Attorney to 
handle certain responsibilities.[91] This provides encouragement that the Internet will be 
more satisfactorily monitored and regulated. 
 
Technological Approaches: 
 
While the easiest approach for individual end users annoyed by spam is just to 
ignore the unwanted messages, there are technological ways to put an end to, or at least 
lessen, the severity of the attacks. In response to the ever prevalent question of what types 
of approaches should be taken to prevent spoof attacks, the answer is part legal and part 
technical. 
 
For the more innocent types of bulk e-mailing, a good place to begin is with your 
own computer, in an attempt to trace the bulk e-mail back to its generator. Within most 
operating systems, there is software entitled “TraceRoute.”[92] Given the domain name 
or an IP address, this software will diagram the net from your server to the server you 
have specified, showing you all the nodes along the way through which the message was 
routed.[93] The last node will be the domain or IP address of the source of the message 
that was received, and the next to last node will be the domain of the upstream provider 
of the owner of the domain you specified.[94] While this might not get you a valid e-mail 
address for contacting the generator directly, it will put you in touch with their upstream 
provider, the companies that sell them Internet access.  
 
Companies who legitimately send bulk e-mail for marketing purposes under their 
first amendment protection should be encouraged, if not required, to utilize data mining 
and targeted e-mail approaches to ensure that the mail they send is delivered only to 
interested parties. In addition, requiring opt-in plans would avoid wasting consumers’ 
time, as well as alleviate some of the taxing on Internet Service Providers who must 
handle the mass of e-mail distributions.  
 
Since spoofers have learned how to take advantage of known holes in the 
operating system with a static IP address, the solution to spoofing starts with a firewall 
that redirects any unknown requests and provides a barrier to mask the IP addresses of 
workstations on the network.[95] Individual consumers as well as companies can have 
firewalls installed, which serve as gatekeepers, and control which e-mail addresses can 
enter and which can exit. They do not, however, control one’s actions once they are 
permitted to enter. Firewalls are designed to slow attackers down, not to stop them 
completely.[96]  
 
Secondly, a company can filter their e-mail traffic in order to prevent IP spoofing. 
With ingress filtering, IP traffic with one’s internal IP range should not be permitted to 
enter that network from an external source. Conversely, with egress filtering, one is 
prevented from within the network, from sending out IP traffic with an origination 
address that is outside your IP range.[97] One thing to be aware of, however, is that while 
most filtering techniques involve rejecting messages that appear to be spam, it is also 
possible to reject all inbound messages except those that can be recognized as legitimate, 
which could be as limiting as allowing mail from only those addresses which are in the 
user’s address book. 
 
A third possibility would be to protect yourself from spam by distributing your e-
mail address in a form that is invalid for a program that specifically searches for e-mail 
addresses, but that is readable for a human.[98] 
 
Lastly, one of the most powerful and effective modes of protection, is encryption. 
Encryption software scrambles the data with a secret code so that no one can make sense 
of it while it is being transmitted.[99] When the data reaches its destination, that same 
software unscrambles the information so that it can be understood by the recipient.[100] 
Encryption can virtually guarantee that “sniffers” will not be able to read the data 
contained within the packets that they detect.[101] The text is essentially unintelligible. 
Moreover, encryption can provide certainty that any message received was transmitted by 
the individual purporting to have sent it.[102] Certain encryption software can even 
scramble the packet header information so that it is impractical to spoof the message at 
all.[103] After all, “Unlike paper mail, the world of electronic mail is a world of 
postcards. The prudent user will place his messages in the ‘envelope’ of 
encryption.”[104] 
 
Although there are precautions that the Internet user may take to mitigate the 
effects of and prevent against a spoof attack, the real solution lies in focused legislation 
with enough clout to make an impact on a daily basis. This threat to modern 
communication should not be underestimated, as the security of the Internet, as well as 
the flourishment of e-commerce could be at stake. Until that happens, technological 
deterrence will somehow have to suffice. 
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